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Abstract
Using a large information approach and full Bayesian VAR techniques, we
study the economic effects of fiscal policy shocks in the U.S. over the last five
decades. We find that omitted variables can explain the well known sample in-
stability of the estimates for the fiscal multiplier. We also find evidence of fiscal
foresight and anticipation of the government spending shocks recovered from
small Structural VARs (SVARs). Despite incorporating forecasts of government
spending, Expectational VARs (EVARs) also show signs of fiscal foresight and
anticipation. Conversely, the fiscal shocks recovered from a large information
BVAR do not exhibit the same problem. Moreover, large information SVARs and
EVARs deliver identical dynamic responses to fiscal shocks. Finally, we report
multipliers and impulse response functions for aggregate government spending
as well as for components of government spending, and find remarkably hetero-
geneous responses.
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1 Introduction
The economic consequences of the 2007-2012 global financial crisis have reignited
interest in fiscal stimulus packages as tools for economic stabilisation. This reflects
the unprecedented scale of the downturn in terms of duration and severity, and the
limits that monetary policy is experiencing with nominal short-term safe interest
rates down to zero. Many developed world governments boosted fiscal spending
and enacted tax reductions with the aim to stimulate consumption, production and
investment.
However, despite extensive research there is still a high degree of uncertainty re-
garding the macroeconomic impact of these measures. Differently from the effects
of monetary policy changes for which there is substantial consensus, the effects of
fiscal policy shocks remain controversial. Indeed, not only the size but also the sign
of the responses of private aggregate demand components is debated. In particular,
there is inconsistent evidence regarding consumption which is a crucial determinant
of the magnitude of the government spending multiplier. Empirical literature has
used different identification strategies and different empirical settings in order to iso-
late fiscal shocks and to estimate their effects without reaching a consensus view.
Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) models in which identification is usually
obtained by assuming decision lags in government spending find rather consistently
that an unexpected increase in government spending raises not only GDP and worked
hours, but also consumption and the real wage (e.g., Blanchard and Perotti (2002),
Fata´s and Mihov (2001), Gal´ı et al. (2007), Perotti (2008)).1 On the contrary, analy-
ses using a narrative identification of government spending shocks typically find that
while government spending raises GDP and worked hours, it lowers consumption and
the real wage (e.g., Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Ramey (2011a), Barro and Redlick
(2009)). Moreover, multiplier estimates appear to be highly unstable and sensitive
to the choice of the sample periods. As pointed out in Perotti (2008, 2011) and
in Ramey (2011b), changes in the sample specification can lead to largely different
results.
As pointed out in Ramey (2011a), the identification of fiscal shocks has also
proven challenging due to potential anticipation effects of fiscal policy changes and
their lagged implementation. While economic agents react to the announcement
of the policy changes, the econometrician only observes the economic variables and
the innovation produced by the implementation of the new policy. This phenomenon,
known as fiscal foresight, poses significant challenges to the econometrician generating
non-fundamental Moving Average (MA) components in the equilibrium processes
(see Leeper et al. (2008)). This implies that fiscal shocks and the relative dynamic
responses cannot be estimated using a standard SVAR (see Hansen and Sargent
(1980), Lippi and Reichlin (1993)).
The study of the consequences of fiscal expansions is also an intriguing problem
from a theoretical point of view. The effects of an increase in government spend-
ing are ambiguous and depend on the assumed model. While the neoclassical Real
Business Cycle (RBC) and the old Keynesian and neo-Keynesian models are broadly
1A thoughtful survey on fiscal SVAR can be found in Caldara and Kamps (2006, 2008).
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consistent with regard to the effect of expansionary government spending on output,
they reach different conclusions on the magnitude of the multiplier and on the sign of
the response of consumption and real wages. Neoclassical models (e.g., Baxter and
King (1993)) generally imply a smaller multiplier than neo-Keynesian models and,
crucially, according to these models the size of the multiplier is sensitive to how the
spending is financed. In particular, the multiplier is smaller if spending is financed
by distortionary taxes rather than by lump sum taxes. Moreover, the RBC model
generally predicts that consumption is negatively related to government spending
while the Keynesian and some neo-Keynesian models predict a positive relation (e.g.,
Gal´ı et al. (2007)).
A growing number of papers convincingly point out that government spending
multipliers cannot be thought of as structural constants but as the responses of
endogenous variables to shocks in government purchases. In this respect, there is
no single government spending multiplier and its value is likely to depend on the
country, the economic phase, the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy, the
degree of openness of the market, the way in which spending is financed, the budget
deficit level, the expectation about future policy adjustments as well as the nature,
direction and magnitude of the shock.2,3
Prior literature has mostly used small information sets to measure the effects of
a change in government spending. Recently, several studies have argued that it is
necessary to incorporate more information in standard SVARs in order to account for
agents’ expectations and to overcome the issue of fiscal foresight (e.g., Ramey (2011a),
Leeper et al. (2011) and Fisher and Peters (2010)) or to control for potentially omitted
variables such as the public debt dynamics (e.g., Favero and Giavazzi (2007) and
Ilzetzki (2011)), the level of economic development, the exchange rate regime, and
the openness to trade (e.g., Ilzetzki et al. (2010), Born et al. (2012)).
Our paper applies a large information approach and full Bayesian VAR techniques
to study the economic effects of fiscal policy shocks using U.S. data from 1959 to
2010. A large Bayesian VAR allows us to significantly expand the dataset used in
order to analyse shocks to government spending.4 This approach aims to align the
respective information sets of the econometrician and of the economic agents. Indeed,
large information datasets are generally considered good approximations of the whole
economy and allow a more careful study of fiscal shocks while controlling for issues
of non-fundamentalness, and more generally for omitted variable problems.
The key findings of our paper can be summarised as follows. First, the well known
2A large number of recent theoretical papers have studied the effectiveness of an increase in
government consumption in various settings (see Woodford (2011), Hall (2009), Christiano et al.
(2011), Monacelli and Perotti (2008), Corsetti et al. (2011), among others).
3A relevant empirical paper studying the variation of fiscal multipliers across the business cycle
is Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012).
4Banbura et al. (2010) show that by applying Bayesian shrinkage, it is possible to handle large
unrestricted VARs that allow the VAR framework to be applied to empirical problems that require the
analysis of large data sets, potentially solving the issue of omitted variable bias. In particular, De Mol
et al. (2008) prove that for the analysis of data sets that are characterised by strong collinearity,
which is typically the case for macroeconomic time series, it is possible to increase the cross-sectional
dimension by consistently setting the degree of shrinkage in relation to the size of the model. In this
way, it is possible to control for over-fitting while preserving the relevant sample information.
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sample instability of the estimates for the fiscal multipliers appear to be significantly
mitigated using a large information approach and is reduced to a statistically in-
significant level, given the confidence level delivered by our econometric tools. After
controlling for changes in monetary policy, fiscal policy, budget structure, credit ac-
cess, financial markets and the openness of the economy, the dynamic responses of
macroeconomics variables appear to be virtually the same across subsamples. This
result seems to indicate that using a large information set it is possible to fully control
for policy changes, revealing that the behaviour of economic agents is more stable
over time than previously reported.
Second, the traditional SVAR approach shows signs of non-fundamentalness for
small VARs (similar findings have been reported in Forni and Gambetti (2010)).
While the issue of non-fundamentalness appears to be somewhat mitigated using a
moderate number of variables, the more general problem of omitted variables likely
remains, resulting in biased IRFs to fiscal shocks.
Third, the Expectational VAR (EVAR) approach proposed in Ramey (2011a) to
overcome non-fundamentalness in small VARs still seems to suffer from non-funda-
mentalness. In fact, using a large information set the dynamic responses to shocks
in expectations, as defined in Ramey (2011a), appear to be identical to the IRFs
produced using the SVAR approach.
Fourth, the use of a large information set seems to overcome the non-fundamen-
talness issues. Using a large Bayesian VAR, the macroeconomic variables related
to output, consumption and investment show a remarkably heterogeneous dynamic
response to shocks in different components of government consumption and invest-
ment. In particular, defence spending appears to elicit dynamic responses that are
qualitatively different compared with nondefence spending. Dynamic responses and
multipliers for fiscal shocks are broadly consistent to those in standard VAR litera-
ture. However, the responses are difficult to reconcile with standard Real Business
Cycle models, and are also not fully consistent with neo-Keynesian predictions.
Our paper is closely related to the paper of Forni and Gambetti (2010), in which
fiscal shocks are studied using a large factor model and sign restrictions. The common
underlying intuition is that large dimension datasets are necessary to close the gap
between the information sets of economic agents and of the econometrician. The
results in Forni and Gambetti (2010) and in our paper are broadly consistent.
To correctly interpret our results, it is important to remember that applying
a static linear VAR approach, we estimate time-invariant and linear (marginally
constant and symmetric with respect to the sign of the shock) government spending
multipliers. Therefore, we implicitly assume through our choice of the econometric
model that the government spending multipliers are independent of the state of the
economy, do not change with the magnitude of the shock, and that positive and
negative shocks impinge on the economy in a symmetric way (a thoughtful discussion
on this point can be found in Parker (2011)). For this reason, our IRFs and multipliers
needs to be thought of as statistical averages over largely different economic conditions
and policies.
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the identi-
fication of fiscal shocks and previous literature, Section 3 motivates our use of the
different components of government spending, Section 4 covers the issue of non-funda-
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mentalness in fiscal VARs, Section 5 introduces our large information fiscal Bayesian
VAR, Section 6 presents our empirical findings and Section 7 concludes.
2 Identification of Fiscal Shocks
Empirical identification of fiscal shocks requires the econometrician to isolate inno-
vations in the fiscal policy variable of interest (for example, government spending)
that are uncorrelated with contemporaneous economic shocks and are separate from
systematic variations related to the business cycle.
Prior literature has identified fiscal shocks by employing three main strategies5.
The first strategy involves estimating Structural Vector Autoregressive Regressions
(SVARs), using orthogonality assumptions to identify innovations in fiscal policy
along the lines of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Using mainly quarterly data, a
large number of studies have employed this approach supplemented with a number
of theoretically motivated identification assumptions, to analyse fiscal policy shocks
over a large number of countries (e.g., Perotti (2008); Gal´ı et al. (2007); Burriel et al.
(2010)). The shocks are identified by exploiting decision lags in policy-making and
information about the elasticity of fiscal variables to economic activity. A differ-
ent agnostic identification procedure based on sign restrictions has been applied in
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) to identify and estimate the effects of a balanced bud-
get and a deficit spending shock. The results of this study suggest that government
spending has a negative impact on both residential and non-residential investment,
but does not affect consumption which shows a small and insignificant response.
As summarised by Hall (2009), prior empirical literature using SVARs finds output
multipliers in the range from 0.5 to 1.0, and consumption multipliers in the range
from somewhat negative to 0.5. Studies also usually find that a positive government
spending shock raises hours worked and real wages, while having a negligible impact
on private investments.
The second strategy relies on developing a narrative identification of the fiscal
shocks. Proponents of narrative identification argue that the SVAR approach fails to
deal with the endogeneity and anticipation of fiscal shocks. In the narrative approach,
the correct timing of fiscal shocks is recovered using historical narrative about major
military events and proxy measures of agents’ expectations of policy changes. Most
studies adopting narrative identifications have focused on defence spending and follow
Barro (1981) in arguing that fluctuations in military spending in the United States
during major wars can be thought of as completely exogenous. Ramey and Shapiro
(1998) use dummy variables in order to identify the correct timing of the shocks to
defence spending and find that consumption falls, implying a very small value for the
government spending multiplier. Barro and Redlick (2009) use data starting in 1917,
including the two World Wars, to estimate that the output multiplier ranges from
0.6 to 0.8. Their estimates of the consumption multiplier are close to zero.
Starting from a narrative approach, Ramey (2011a) argues that in the SVAR ap-
proach the government spending shocks estimated by the econometrician are likely
5An in-depth survey of the state of knowledge about the government spending multiplier can be
found in Ramey (2011c).
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to be anticipated, and that this can lead to a spurious finding of a positive effect of
these shocks on consumption and real wages. The general issue originates from the
fact that the information sets of the private agents and the econometrician may be
misaligned. In the case of fiscal policy anticipation, this would mean that private
agents have a broader information set relative to the ex-post variables observed by
the econometrician. The fiscal policy shocks cannot be recovered since the MA rep-
resentation is non-invertible or non-fundamental for the variables used in the VAR,
due to fiscal foresight.
Given this criticism there would be little basis to use a SVAR approach, un-
less it could be demonstrated that in practice anticipation issues are not present in
the estimation of fiscal policy shocks (possibly due to liquidity constraints agents,
rational-inattentive consumers, or high uncertainty in the future path of taxes and
spending) or that it is possible to formulate econometric techniques to overcome the
non-fundamentalness issue.6
The solution proposed in Ramey (2011a) is to use a direct measure of change in the
expectations of the present value of government spending to obtain an Expectational
VAR (EVAR). Using this approach, private sector forecast revisions appear to have
a strong negative effect on consumption and a low multiplier for GDP.
The third strategy uses natural experiments as sources of exogenous variations
in government spending, taxes or transfers that are uncorrelated with other contem-
poraneous macroeconomic events. Natural experiments have been used in different
settings that range from regional to internationally funded development programs.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2011) focus on cross-state variations in U.S. military spend-
ing activity that are likely to be uncorrelated with state-level economic conditions.
Regional fiscal GDP multipliers estimated using this identification strategy are large
and above unity. Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) also study the state-level ef-
fects of federal spending, but focus on the New Deal period using a measure of swing
voting behaviour as an instrument. The output multiplier is estimated between 0.9
to 1.7. Acconcia et al. (2011) exploit anti-mafia legislation outcomes on municipal
budget spending in Italy and find estimated spending multipliers ranging from 1.4
to 2.0. Kraay (2010) uses World Bank project-level disbursement data to isolate
the component of World Bank-financed government spending in a given year that
is associated with past project approval decisions and then uses this as an instru-
ment for total government spending, in order to estimate spending multipliers in a
sample of 29 primarily low-income countries. The estimated GDP multiplier is fairly
low and around 0.5. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Johnson
et al. (2006), Parker et al. (2011), and Misra and Surico (2011) have exploited the
randomised timing of the receipt of payments to estimate the effects of the fiscal
stimulus payments on consumption expenditures for the tax rebate episodes of 2001
6Burriel et al. (2010) report that, using a standard SVAR approach with U.S. and Euro area
data, the identified government spending shocks can be interpreted in light of historical episodes.
Moreover, the tax shocks of the VAR in the case of the U.S. seem to reproduce the episodes identified
by Romer and Romer (2010) with their natural experiment approach. Ilzetzki et al. (2010) provide
some evidence that fiscal shocks are not foreseen. Using data revisions by central banks, for which
time series of government consumption data of different vintages are available – Bulgaria, Ecuador,
and Uruguay – the authors show that errors in the central banks preliminary estimate of government
consumption are clearly correlated with the VAR residuals.
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and 2008. Besley et al. (2012) employ evidence from a stamp duty holiday in U.K.
to identify the effects of a transactions tax. Other studies have used changes in Con-
gressional committee chairmanships to identify changes in federal spending at the
state level in the U.S. (Cohen et al. (2010)); Medicaid transfers to U.S. states during
the 2009 fiscal stimulus (Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012)); variation across U.S. states
in enforcing a balanced-budget (Clemens and Miran (2010)); and variation in federal
spending at local levels due to sharp changes in population estimates stemming from
methodological changes in census years (Serrato and Wingender (2010)).
3 Heterogeneity in Government Spending
As noted in Oh and Reis (2011), macroeconomic research on fiscal shocks has pri-
marily studied the effects of increases in government purchases (consumption plus
investment).7 This choice is motivated by the fact that this component of spending
is viewed as the most exogenous component of total government spending relative to
the business cycles and likely does not affect intertemporal consumption choices or
marginal rates of substitutions between consumption and work.
Extant research pursuing a narrative approach has argued that only military
spending is truly exogenous being caused by geopolitical events uncorrelated with
other economic shocks. Changes in defence spending have been large in magnitude
and are arguably unpredictable. The historically high variance of these shocks allows
them to be readily identified and their economic consequences to be assessed. Military
shocks also present the interesting feature that they can be considered as purely
unproductive, thrown-in-the-ocean, spending, offering the possibility of discriminating
between the predictions of different neo-Keynesian and neoclassical models.
However, one possible criticism of the results obtained in the narrative literature
is that the evidence comes primarily form the huge defence spending spikes related
to World War II and the Korea War, and may not be relevant for today economy.
Prior literature has noted that significant military spending due to major military
events are historically associated with command-type interventions in the economy,
including rationing (see Hall (2009)). These can result in issues of validity and a
failure of the identifying assumptions.
Conversely, the SVAR approach mainly uses aggregate government spending and
often the time series used excludes WWII. In these samples fiscal shocks are smaller
and the parameters are poorly estimated. Moreover, SVARs use components of gov-
ernment spending that may not be completely exogenous even in absence of fiscal
foresight, potentially suffering from endogeneity problems. Finally, components of
nondefence government spending may enter either the aggregate production function
or the utility function of agents, producing externalities. Hence, results from this
7Government expenditures are the sum of purchases, transfers and interest payments. While the
latter component of the budget is small the first two are relatively large although the second is the
most countercyclical one. For example, in the U.S. from the end of 2007 until the end of 2009, only
one quarter of the increase government expenditures is accounted for by government purchases, while
three quarters of the increase is due to increases in transfers. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of
empirical research on the macroeconomic effects of transfers.
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Figure 1: Government Spending Breakdown (billions of U.S. dollars).
1959 1981 2010
State and Local Investment 13.3 10.0 11.1
State and Local Consumption 27.6 44.7 47.9
Nondefence Investment 1.6 2.0 1.8
Nondefence Consumption 7.7 11.2 11.7
Defence Investment 13.2 4.8 4.2
Defence Consumption 36.6 27.3 23.2
State and Local Spending 40.9 54.7 59.1
Nondefence Spending 9.3 13.2 13.5
Defence Spending 49.8 32.1 27.5
Table 1: Government Spending Breakdown
SVAR methodology may not be useful to discriminate between competing economic
theories.
Furthermore, in the last fifty years, defence spending has fallen from almost 50 percent
of government spending to 28 percent in 2010 (see Figure 1 and Table 1). While
federal nondefence spending is a trivial part of overall government spending, state and
local spending has become significantly more important, equaling 59 percent in 2010.
The expansion in state and local spending is mostly related to spending on education,
health and public services which may enter the aggregate production function. The
varying composition of government expenditure over time, the potentially differential
8
effects of the various components of spending and their interaction, could result
in an omitted variable problem in studies that do not control for these sources of
heterogeneity.
4 Fundamentalness in Fiscal SVAR models
Let us assume that the true equilibrium solution of the equations describing the
economy, at any point in time, can be approximated by a VARMA process solution
to the reduced form system of equilibrium equations,
Φ(L)Yt = Θ(L)ut , ut ∼ w.n.(0, Iq) (1)
where Yt is an N -dimensional vector of macroeconomic variables and ut is a q-
dimensional vector of orthonormal white noise processes, that can be thought of
as structural shocks.8 The AR and MA filters are polynomial matrices defined as
Φ(L) = IN +
∑p1
k=1 φkL
k and Θ(L) =
∑p2
k=0 θkL
k, respectively, where In is the n-
dimensional identity matrix and L is the lag operator. The AR component is generally
assumed to be causal and stationary. This condition amounts to requiring that all
the complex roots of the determinants of the AR matrix lie outside the unit circle.
Given the assumption of stationarity, the process Yt always admits a Wold rep-
resentation, that is a decomposition in t ≡ Yt − P (Yt|Yt−1, Yt−2, . . . }), the linear
forecast errors of Yt,
Yt = δt + Ψ(L)t t ∼ w.n.(0,Σq) (2)
where Ψ(L) = IN +
∑∞
k=1 ψkL
k and δt is a deterministic process.
If we assume that the MA component is also invertible – i.e., all the complex roots
of the determinants of the MA matrix lie outside the unit circle – then t and ut belong
to the space generated by present and past values of Yt. The structural shocks ut are
a linear combination of innovations t, and we say that ut is Yt-fundamental.
9
If instead the determinant of the MA matrix has at least one root inside the
unit circle, than t and ut do not live in the same space. In particular, ut does not
belong to the space generated by present and past Yt and we say that ut is Yt-non-
fundamental.10
A crucial point is that fundamental and non-fundamental MA components are
observationally equivalent. Two ARMA processes with the same AR component and
with MA components such that
Θ(L)ut = Θ˜(L)u˜t (3)
Θ(z)Θ(z−1)′ = Θ˜(z)Θ˜(z−1)′ (4)
8Yt can be either an N -dimensional vector whose entries are I(0) or k-differences of I(k) processes.
9A comprehensive review on non-fundamentalness in structural econometric models can be found
in Alessi et al. (2011).
10If at least one of the roots of the determinant of the MA matrix lie on the unit circle, the MA
component is non-invertible but is not necessarily non-fundamental.
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have identical covariance generating functions and spectra. All the observationally
equivalent representations are generated by Blaschke transformations (see Lippi and
Reichlin (1994)).11
Essentially, a Blaschke transformation is the product of rotations and transforma-
tions that flip fundamental roots into non-fundamental ones, and vice versa. While
simple rotations account for the form of non-uniqueness that Sims (1980) describes
and that require an appropriate selection of an identification scheme (e.g., recur-
sive identification, sign restrictions, long run restriction, etc.), more general Blaschke
transformations relate fundamental to non-fundamental representations.
Non-fundamentalness can appear in the estimation of economic models either
endogenously – a common feature of rational expectations models (see Hansen and
Sargent (1980)) – or exogenously, due to the dynamics of exogenous variables (e.g.,
technology shocks in Lippi and Reichlin (1993)). In the case of fiscal shocks, non-
fundamentalness may arise endogenously due to the anticipation of fiscal shocks by
forward-looking agents. It is worth noting that non-fundamentalness is an issue only
when estimating structural models and not for forecasting. In the latter case, only
the estimate of the innovations’ space is necessary.
To understand how endogenous non-fundamentalness can plague the estimation
of fiscal policy shocks, we need to acknowledge that the econometrician only observes
a subset yt of the vector of variables fully describing the economy, Yt. Structural
shocks affecting the economy Yt, will typically also affect the subset of macroeco-
nomic variables, yt. However, a Yt-fundamental structural shock ut can become
yt-non-fundamental when observing only a limited amount of information about the
economy-wide process Yt.
The standard econometric practice consists of estimating an approximated VAR(p)
model with data about a small number of variables, yt,
yt = A(L)yt−1 + εt , εt ∼ w.n.(0,Σε) , t ∈ Z (5)
where A(L) is a n× n filter such that det(In −A(z)) has roots only outside the unit
circle. This condition is equivalent to the assumptions of causality and stationarity for
the VAR model. In the SVAR literature it is usually assumed that structural shocks
are yt-fundamental. For yt-fundamental shocks, innovations εt coincide with ut up
to an orthogonal transformation. Therefore, once eq. (5) is estimated, the structural
shocks can be estimated as uˆt = Rˆεˆt, for an appropriately selected rotation matrix R,
such that RRT = In, where the estimate Rˆ of R is obtained by imposing n(n− 1)/2
restrictions derived from economic theory.
There are two possible issues in the standard SVAR econometric procedure. First,
a finite lag VAR representation of the underlying process may not exist and there-
fore a VAR(p) model may estimate biased impulse response functions. Second, the
assumption of fundamentalness of structural shocks with respect to the observed
variables may not hold since crucial state variables do not appear in the VAR.
11A complex-valued matrix is a Blaschke matrix if it has no poles inside the unit circle and
B(z)B(z−1)′ = I. It can be shown that a generic n-dimensional Blaschke matrix can be expanded
into the product of a finite number of constant orthogonal matrices and of diagonal matrices with a
Blaschke factor R(α, z) = diag( z−α
1−α¯z , In−1).
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In the context of fiscal SVARs, the anticipation of fiscal shocks can introduce
non-fundamentalness in the structural shocks. Forward-looking agents incorporate
information about future fiscal shocks in their expectations and would react to an-
nouncements of policy changes. An econometrician estimating a standard SVAR
would miss the true structural shocks (the signals about future changes in taxes
or government spending), and would instead identify actual policy implementation
which likely lags the announcement. In this case, structural shocks ut would belong
to the space spanned by future values of yt as well. This phenomenon is called fiscal
foresight and is at the core of the Ramey (2011a) critique of traditional fiscal SVAR.
This criticism is well founded in economic theory. Using a neoclassical growth
model with two shocks, Leeper et al. (2008) show that fiscal foresight poses formidable
challenges to the econometrician. Even in a very simple setting, anticipation effects
can distort interpretation of the identified shocks. In particular, they show that the
MA representation of any pair of variables selected from capital, taxes and technology,
is non-fundamental.
4.1 Back to Fundamentals
Non-fundamentalness can always be framed as a problem of omitted variables, origi-
nating from the misalignment of the respective information sets of the econometrician
and the agent.
Two solutions are possible to solve the issue of non-fundamentalness. The first
approach, proposed in Lippi and Reichlin (1994) consists of applying appropriate
Blaschke matrices to the VAR innovations in order to retrieve the fundamental shocks.
The Blaschke matrices transform the recovered innovations into linear combinations
of past and future innovations, allowing a non-fundamental MA representation to be
mapped into a fundamental one. Mertens and Ravn (2010) have estimated the effects
of government spending shocks using Blaschke matrices. The disadvantage of this
approach is the non-uniqueness of Blaschke matrices. Additional restrictions derived
from theoretical models are necessary to identify the correct MA component among
different possible MA representations.
The second approach consists of enlarging the econometrician’s information space;
this idea underpins most of the solutions proposed in the empirical literature on fiscal
shocks.12
There are two possibilities to enlarge the econometrician information space: one in
the time dimension (including observations from future time periods), and the other
in the cross-sectional dimension (enlarging the dataset with additional variables).
The first method has been initially proposed in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and
then used in a more systematic way in Tenhofen and Wolff (2007). They allow present
output and consumption to depend on one forward lag of fiscal variables, assuming
perfect foresight of fiscal shocks one quarter ahead. Unfortunately, this assumption
12A different possibility unexploited in fiscal SVAR is proposed in Lanne and Saikkonen (2011)
and is represented by Non-causal VARs. The assumption of causality (invertibility of the AR matrix)
can be relaxed and the observable variables can also be allowed to depend on future values of the
associated disturbance process. Non-causal VARs can be seen as approximated representations of
VARMA models with non-invertible MA representations.
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is quite strong and rather arbitrary.
The solution proposed in Ramey (2011a) is to enlarge the VAR using variables
that may proxy for the agent’s expectations (EVAR) (see Perotti (2011); Ramey
(2011b)). In Ramey (2011a) two different measures of expectations are proposed: a
military news variable based on narrative evidence for defence spending and a fiscal
expectations variable based on the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).13 Along
similar lines, Leeper et al. (2011) propose using the spread between municipal and
treasury bonds as a measure of the anticipation of future tax changes.14 Fisher and
Peters (2010) use stock returns of large U.S. defence contractors to identify govern-
ment spending shocks. The disadvantage in using proxy variables for expectations is
that to some extent whether these variables are able to correctly capture the agent’s
expectations is a matter of assumptions.
More generally, Giannone and Reichlin (2006) assess the possibility of using larger
data sets when dealing with non-fundamental models, proposing a criterion to detect
non-fundamentalness based on Granger causality (an updated discussion can be found
in Forni and Gambetti (2011)). Non-fundamentalness can be assessed empirically
by testing whether the variables of interest are weakly exogenous with respect to
potentially relevant additional variables, under the conditions that the additional
variables are driven by the same structural shocks influencing the variables of interest,
plus possible additional structural shocks.
Very large dataset (N ∼ 100) are considered to be a good proxy for the whole
economy and therefore, the correct treatment of such an information set should allow
the econometrician to better assess and overcome issues of non-fundamentalness. As
proved in Giannone and Reichlin (2006)), the structural shocks are correctly recov-
ered using large information under the assumptions that the shocks of interest are
pervasive throughout the cross-section and that they generate heterogeneous dynam-
ics. Remaining shocks need not propagate too widely and therefore, can meaningfully
be considered idiosyncratic. The most suitable econometric models to incorporate
large datasets are Factor Augmented VARs (e.g., Bernanke et al. (2004)), dynamic
factor models (Forni et al. (2000, 2009)), and the recently proposed Large Bayesian
VARs (see De Mol et al. (2008); Banbura et al. (2010)). While non-fundamentalness
is a generic feature of standard VARs, for models with reduced rank (N > q) (e.g.,
factor models) non-fundamentalness is a non-generic issue (see Forni et al. (2009)).
In this respect, a large information approach is the most natural way to deal
with the non-fundamentalness issue in the identification of fiscal shocks. Forni and
Gambetti (2010) use a large structural factor model to study fiscal shocks, finding
indications that the government spending shock is non-fundamental for the variables
commonly used in the SVAR literature. Factor models are less general than VAR
models and impose restricted VAR relations among variables.
In this paper we adopt a large Bayesian VAR approach. Large Bayesian VARs
offer a natural solution to the curse of dimensionality problem, have proven to be
13The news variable has very low predictive power for post-1955 samples, that exclude WWII and
the Korea War, as discussed in Ramey (2011a).
14They exploit a feature of the U.S. tax code that exempts municipal bonds from federal income
tax and argue that the implicit tax rate at which the investor is indifferent between the tax exempt
and taxable bond could predict subsequent movements in individual tax rates.
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competitive with factor models, and allow for a more flexible and transparent treat-
ment of large information datasets (Banbura et al. (2010); Giannone et al. (2012)).
Moreover, they have a clear interpretation in terms of factor analysis (De Mol et al.
(2008)). In Appendix A we present a simplified model to illustrate the issues of non-
fundamentalness and to motivate the use of a large information set to deal with this
issue.
5 A Large Information Fiscal Bayesian VAR
Banbura et al. (2010) show that by applying Bayesian shrinkage, it is possible to
handle large unrestricted VARs. This allows the VAR framework to be applied to
empirical problems that require large data sets, potentially solving the issue of omit-
ted variable bias. In particular, De Mol et al. (2008) prove that for the analysis of
data sets that are characterised by strong collinearity, which is typically the case for
macroeconomic time series, it is possible to increase the cross-sectional dimension by
consistently setting the degree of shrinkage in relation to the size of the model. In
this way, it is possible to control for over-fitting while preserving the relevant sample
information.
We consider the following VAR(4) model:
yt = C +A1yt−1 +A2yt−2 +A3yt−3 +A4yt−4 + εt (6)
where εt is an n-dimensional Gaussian white noise, with covariance matrix Σε, yt is a
n×1 vector of endogenous variable and C, A1,. . . , A4 and Σε are matrices of suitable
dimensions containing the model’s unknown parameters.
We adopt conjugate prior distributions for VAR coefficients belonging to the
Normal-Inverse-Wishart family
Σ ∼ IW (Ψ, d) (7)
β|Σ ∼ N (b,Σ⊗ Ω) (8)
where β ≡ vec([C,A1, . . . , A4]′), and the elements Ψ, d, b and Ω embed prior assump-
tions on the variance and mean of the VAR parameters. These are typically functions
of lower dimensional vectors of hyperparameters. This family of priors is commonly
used in the BVAR literature due to the advantage that the posterior distribution can
be analytically computed.
As for the conditional prior of β, we adopt two prior densities used in the existing
literature for the estimation of BVARs in levels: the Minnesota prior, introduced in
Litterman (1979), and the sum-of-coefficients prior proposed in Doan et al. (1983).
• Minnesota prior: This prior is based on the assumption that each variable
follows a random walk process, possibly with drift. This is quite a parsimo-
nious, though reasonable approximation of the behaviour of economic variables.
Following Kadiyala and Karlsson (1997), we set the degrees of freedom of the
Inverse-Wishart distribution to d = n + 2 which is the minimum value that
guarantees the existence of the prior mean of Σ.15 Moreover, we assume Ψ to
15The prior mean of Σ is equal to Ψ/(d− n− 1)
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be a diagonal matrix with n×1 elements ψ along the diagonal. The coefficients
A1, . . . , A4 are assumed to be a priori independent. Under these assumptions,
the following first and second moments analytically characterise this prior:
E[(Ak)i,j ] =
{
δi
0
j = i, k = 1
otherwise
(9)
V [(Ak)i,j ] =
{
λ2
k2
ϑλ
2
k2
ψi
ψj/(d−n−2)
j = i
otherwise.
(10)
These can be casted in the form of (8). The coefficients δi that were originally
set by Litterman were δi = 1 reflecting the belief that all the variables of interest
follow a random walk. However, it is possible to set the priors in a manner that
incorporates the specific characteristics of the variables. We set δi = 0 for
variables that in our prior beliefs follow a white noise process and δi = 1 for
those variables that in our prior beliefs follow a random walk process.16 We
assume a diffuse prior on the intercept. The factor 1/k2 is the rate at which prior
variance decreases with increasing lag length. The coefficient ϑ weights the lags
of the other variables with respect to the variable’s own lags. We set ϑ = 1. The
hyperparameter λ controls the overall tightness of the prior distribution around
the random walk or white noise process. A setting of λ = ∞ corresponds to
the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. For λ = 0, the posterior equals the
prior and the data does not influence the estimates.
The Minnesota prior can be implemented using Theil mixed estimations with
a set of Td artificial observations – i.e., dummy observations
yd =

diag(δ1ψ1, ...., δnψn)/λ
0n(p−1)×n
....................................
diag(ψ1, ....., ψn)
....................................
01×n
 xd =

Jp ⊗ diag(ψ1, ....., ψn)/λ 0np×1
.................................... .........
0n×np 0p×1
.................................... .........
01×np ε

where Jp = diag(1, 2, ..., p).
17 In this setting, the first block of dummies in
the matrices imposes priors on the autoregressive coefficients, the second block
implements priors for the covariance matrix and the third block reflects the
uninformative prior for the intercept (ε is a very small number).
• Sum-of-coefficients prior: To further favour unit roots and cointegration
and to reduce the importance of the deterministic component implied by the
estimation of the VAR conditioning on the first observations, we adopt a refine-
ment of the Minnesota prior known as sum-of-coefficients prior (Sims (1980)).
16Details of our prior selection are provided in Appendix B where we describe the dataset used.
17This amounts to specifying the parameter of the Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior as
b = (x′dxd)
−1x′dyd,Ω0 = (x
′
dxd)
−1,Ψ = (yd − xdB0)′(yd − xdB0)
.
14
Prior literature has suggested that with very large datasets, forecasting per-
formance can be improved by imposing additional priors that constrain the
sum of coefficients. To implement this procedure we add the following dummy
observations to the ones for the Normal-Inverse-Wishart prior:
yd = diag(δ1µ1, ...., δnµn)/τ
xd = ((11×p)⊗ diag(δ1µ1, ...., δnµn)/τ 0n×1) . (11)
In this set-up, the set of parameters µ aims to capture the average levels of each
of the variables, while the parameter τ controls for the degree of shrinkage and
as τ goes to ∞, we approach the case of no shrinkage.
The joint setting of these priors depends on the set of hyperparameters γ ≡
{λ, τ, ψ, µ} that control the tightness of the prior information and that are effectively
additional parameters of the model.
The adoption of these priors has been shown to improve the forecasting perfor-
mance of VAR models, effectively reducing the estimation error while introducing
only relatively small biases in the estimates of the parameters (e.g. Sims and Zha
(1996); De Mol et al. (2008); Banbura et al. (2010)). The regression model augmented
with the dummies can be written as a VAR(1) process
y∗ = x∗B + e∗ (12)
where the starred variables are obtained by stacking y = (y1, . . . , yT )
′, x = (x1, . . . , xT )′
for xt = (y
′
t−1, . . . , y′t−4, 1)′, and ε = (ε1, . . . , εT ) together with the corresponding
dummy variables as y∗ = (y′ y′d)
′, x∗ = (x′ x′d)
′, e∗ = (e′ e′d)
′. The starred variables
have length T∗ = T +Td in the temporal dimension, and B is the matrix of regressors
of suitable dimensions.
The resulting posteriors are:
Σ|y ∼ IW
(
Ψ˜, Td + 2 + T − k
)
(13)
β|Σ, y ∼ N
(
βˆ,Σ⊗ (x∗′x∗)−1) (14)
where βˆ = vec(Bˆ), Bˆ = (x∗′x∗)−1x∗′y∗ and Ψ˜ = (y∗ − x∗Bˆ)′(y∗ − x∗Bˆ). It is
worth noting that the posterior expectations of the coefficients coincide with the
OLS estimates of a regression with variables y∗ and x∗.
5.1 Prior Selection
In selecting the value of the hyperparameters of our priors, we adopt the pure
Bayesian method proposed in Giannone et al. (2012).18
From a purely Bayesian perspective, the informativeness of the prior distribution
is one of the many unknown parameters of the model that can be inferred given
18In prior literature, a number of heuristic methodologies have been proposed to set the hyperpriors
either by maximising the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the model (see Doan et al. (1983))
or by controlling for over-fitting by choosing the shrinkage parameters that yields a desired in-sample
fit (see Banbura et al. (2010)).
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the conditional posterior distribution of the observed data. Therefore, hyperparam-
eters can be optimally chosen by maximising the posterior distribution given by the
product of the maximum likelihood (ML) of the observed data conditional on the
hyperparameters, p(y|γ), and the hyperprior distribution p(γ)
p(γ|y) ∝ p(y|γ) · p(γ) (15)
The hyperprior can be viewed as a level two prior on the hyperparameters, while the
maximum likelihood is the probability of the data as a function of the hyperparameter
obtained by integrating over the VAR coefficients
p(y|γ) =
∫
p(y|θ, γ)p(θ|γ)dθ . (16)
For a flat hyperprior, the posterior coincides with the ML, hence the choice of the
hyperparameters can be thought of as maximising the one-step-ahead out-of-sample
forecasting ability of the model. This proposed procedure selects the optimal amount
of shrinkage given the sample and the model. The selected priors are tighter when
the model features many unknown coefficients relative to the available data.
In order to use this methodology for a large information set, we make additional
assumptions to reduce the number of hyperparameters to be estimated and the un-
certainty in the estimation of the VAR coefficients.19
Following the empirical BVAR literature we fix the diagonal elements ψ and µ
using sample information. Although, from a Bayesian perspective the parameters ψ
should be set using only prior knowledge, it is common practice to pin down their
value using the variance of the residuals from a univariate autoregressive model of
order p for each the variables. In the same way, the sample average of each variable
is chosen to set the µ parameters.
Finally, we set a very loose sum-of-coefficients prior choosing τ = 50λ. In this
way, the determination of a rather large number of hyperparameters is reduced to
selecting a unique scalar that controls for the the tightness of the prior information.
Following Giannone et al. (2012), we adopt a Gamma distribution with mode
equal to 0.2 (the value recommended by Sims and Zha (1996)) and standard deviation
equal to 0.4 as hyperprior density for λ.20 Given the choice of conjugate priors, the
ML is available in closed form and the selection of the tightness of λ amounts to
maximising a closed form posterior (see Giannone et al. (2012)).
6 The Dynamic Effects of Fiscal Shocks
6.1 Data Description
The main macroeconomic variables of interest in our study are government con-
sumption expenditures and investment (spending), gross domestic product, personal
current taxes, hourly wages, personal consumption expenditures and gross private do-
mestic investment. For government spending, we separately collect data for federal
19In the largest specification of our LARGE VAR we have about 50 scalar hyperparameters con-
trolling the tightness of the priors.
20Using a flat hyperprior for λ we obtain similar numerical results.
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defence, federal nondefence and state and local governments. For personal consump-
tion expenditures, we collect data for durables, nondurables and services.
As is standard in prior literature, we collect quarterly data and use real log per
capita for the output, investment and consumption variables, except those variables
expressed in rates. We use the three-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate adjusted for
changes in the consumer price index to calculate real short-term interest rates.
We expand the dataset to include labour, consumer sentiment, equity market,
credit market, housing, production, business activity, exchange rate and monetary
variables, as well as consumer and producer price indices. We also collect components
of some of these variables as well as additional relevant macroeconomic variables to
develop a large dataset of 128 variables which is used to extract commonalities using
factor analysis. A brief description of all the variables used in our study is presented
in Appendix B. We indicate the variables that we apply logarithms to, as well as the
variables with assumed random walk priors. The variables used in the various VAR
specifications are also indicated.
We collect quarterly data for the period from 1959Q1 to 2010Q4, balancing the
aim of assembling a large data set with a sufficiently long time series. We split our
full sample period of 1959Q1 to 2010Q4 into two subsamples, covering 1981Q1 to
2010Q4, and 1959Q1 to 1981Q1.21 The 1981Q1 split point is chosen in order to
assess the subsample instability claimed in Perotti (2008) and is in agreement with
a large stream of literature that finds a structural break in the U.S. economy in
the early 1980s. This split point allows us to expand our dataset for the subsample
1981Q1 to 2010Q4 by including federal government and state and local government
spending forecasts published in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. We exclude periods prior to 1959 in order not
to have the Korea War and WWII in our sample, thus avoiding possible issues of
validity associated with large military spending shocks in these periods.
We identify fiscal shock using a generalised recursive identification. We consider
the following VAR specifications:
• SMALL: This is a small fiscal VAR with 3 variables including government
consumption expenditures and investment (GCEC96), personal current taxes
(PERSTAX) and gross domestic product (GDPC96).
• MEDIUM: In the base specification, this is a 9 variable VAR including govern-
ment consumption expenditures and investment (GCEC96), personal current
taxes (PERSTAX), gross domestic product (GDPC96), hourly wages (RCPHBS),
personal consumption expenditures on durables (PCDG), nondurables (PCND)
and services (PCESV), gross private domestic investment (GPDIC96), and real
rates (REALRATES). In VAR specifications where the components of govern-
ment consumption expenditures and investment are used, this is a 14 variable
VAR including federal defence consumption and expenditures (DEFSPEND),
federal defence investment (DGI), federal nondefence consumption and expen-
ditures (CIVSPEND), federal nondefence investment (NDGI), state and local
21In robustness checks we also use a shortened sample from 1959Q1 to 2005Q4 to exclude the
recent financial crisis and economic recession.
17
consumption and expenditures (SLSPEND), and state and local investment
(SLINV) in addition to the other variables. In each specification where the
components are used, the shock variable is ordered first. In the specifications
where the SPF government federal spending forecasts are used, the various
components of federal spending are aggregated. Along with the relevant spend-
ing forecast variable to which a shock is applied, these specifications have 10
variables. A similar approach is used for the VAR specifications where state
and local spending forecasts are used.
• LARGE: In the base specification, this is a 39 variable VAR. In addition to
the variables in the MEDIUM VAR, this specification includes federal gov-
ernment current receipts (FGRECPT), net federal government saving (deficit)
(FGDEF), total public debt (PUBDEBT), unemployment rate (UNRATE),
average duration of unemployment (UEMPMEAN), total consumer credit out-
standing (TOTALSL), commercial and industrial loans at commercial banks
(BUSLOANS), real estate loans at commercial banks (REALLN), oil price
per barrel (OILPRICE), consumer sentiment index (UMCSENT), gross private
saving (GPSAVE), disposable personal income (DSPIC96), personal consump-
tion price index (PCECTPI), new orders index (NAPMNOI), inventories index
(NAPMII), after-tax corporate profits (CPATAX), industrial production index
(INDPRO), producer price index (PPIACO), productivity (OPHPBS), housing
starts (HOUST), exports of goods and services (EXPGSC96), imports of goods
and services (IMPGSC96), Euro to U.S. Dollar exchange rate (EUDOLLDR),
S&P 500 stock market returns (SP500), Dow Jones Industrial Average stock
market returns (DJIA), AAA corporate bond yield (AAA), 10-year U.S. Trea-
sury rate (GS10), growth in M2 money stock (M2SL), and effective federal funds
rate (FEDFUNDS). In VAR specifications where the components of government
consumption expenditures and investment are used, this is a 44 variable VAR
with each component to which the shock is applied ordered first. In specifica-
tions where the SPF government spending forecasts are used (federal or state
and local), this is a 40 variable VAR.
6.2 Subsample Instability
Our first set of analyses is related to the sample instability highlighted by Perotti
(2008) who finds inconsistency in the response of consumption to government spend-
ing depending on the subsample used. For example, he finds a positive and statis-
tically significant response in the 1960s and 1970s, but an insignificant response in
the 1980s and 1990s. Similar results are reported in several other studies. Therefore,
we split our full sample period of 1959Q1 to 2010Q4 into two subsamples, covering
1981Q1 to 2010Q4, and 1959Q1 to 1981Q1.
We use the MEDIUM and LARGE VAR specifications to assess the sample insta-
bility issue. Figure 2 presents the impulse response function for the full sample and
the two subsamples. The plots also depict the posterior coverage intervals at the 0.68
and 0.9 levels. While the IRFs for the MEDIUM VAR show subsample instability,
the LARGE VAR does not exhibit significant subsample instability. In particular,
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Figure 2: IRFs to a shock in total Government Consumption for Subsamples. The subsam-
ple 1959Q1 to 2010Q4 is plotted as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals at the 0.68
and 0.9 level. The dashed line and dotted lines in each chart are the responses for the periods 1981Q1
to 2010Q4, and 1959Q1 to 1981Q1, respectively. The left column of plots shows the MEDIUM VAR
responses, with the SMALL VAR responses for the period 1959Q1 to 2010Q4 superimposed as lines
with crosses on the plots for Government Consumption and Investment and GDP. The right column
of plots presents the LARGE VAR plots for each subsample.
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the MEDIUM VAR shows subsample instability across all the variables we study,
including GDP, durables and nondurables consumption, investment and real rates.
In the LARGE VAR, the IRFs for both subsamples are within the posterior coverage
interval at the 0.68 level for most of the horizon. The LARGE VAR responses to a
shock in government spending are positive and significant for GDP and nondurables
consumption, insignificant for durables consumption and investment, and negative
and significant for real rates. The subsample instability is also not present in the
LARGE VAR for shocks to the components of government spending. The results for
the components are included in the Technical Appendix to this paper. Overall, the
results for the LARGE VAR suggest that the previously reported subsample instabil-
ity may be due to an omitted variable problem. Therefore, we can use the LARGE
VAR specifications for different subsamples without loss of validity.
6.3 Fundamentalness
In order to assess the issue of non-fundamentalness, we use the large dataset of 128
variables to extract five factors that explain over 99 percent of the variance in the
data.22 We use these five factors to conduct Granger causality tests on the residuals of
government spending and the components of government spending from the SMALL,
MEDIUM and LARGE VARs for the full sample and the two subsamples. Table
2 reports the results for the Granger causality tests. Factor 1 Granger causes the
residuals in the SMALL VAR for the 1959Q1 to 1981Q1 subsample, while Factor 2
Granger causes the residuals in the SMALL VAR for the full sample period and for
the 1981Q1 to 201Q4 subsample. The results are mostly significant at the 5 percent
level.
Although the 9 variable MEDIUM VAR performs better, the null hypothesis
that the factors do not Granger cause the residuals of government spending cannot
be rejected with a high confidence level. For example, for the 1981Q1 to 2010Q4
subsample, Factor 1 appears to Granger cause the residuals of government spend-
ing, although only at the 20 percent significance level. This result provides further
evidence that the subsample instability is caused by an omitted variable problem.
Similarly, looking at the components of government spending, Factor 4 appears to
Granger cause the residuals from defence investment, again at the 20 percent signif-
icance level. Overall, the Granger causality results do not provide strong evidence
of fundamentalness in the MEDIUM VAR. Using a different approach, Forni and
Gambetti (2010) report stronger non-fundamentalness results for a 6 variable VAR.
Expanding the information set to the LARGE VAR significantly improves the
Granger causality results. None of the factors appear to Granger cause the residuals
of government spending or the components of government spending in any speci-
fication or subsample for the LARGE VAR. Hence, there is no indication of non-
fundamentalness in the LARGE VAR. Subsequently, using the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters data on federal and state and local spending forecasts, we conduct
Granger causality tests on “Ramey” forecast errors as well as expectation revisions
22We used several criteria to assess the appropriate number of factors to extract, including variance
explained, the criteria proposed in Bai and Ng (2002), and the Onatski (2009) test. We chose the
largest number proposed in the different tests. Factors are extracted using an EM algorithm.
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defined in Perotti (2011). The results are presented at the bottom of Table 2. Factor
1 Granger causes the “Ramey” federal spending forecast errors at the 1 percent sig-
nificance level. Similarly, the expectation revisions for federal spending are Granger
caused by four of the five factors. Factor 2 also Granger causes expectation revisions
for state and local spending at the 10 percent significance level.
Finally, we also conduct a Granger causality test using the “Ramey” military
spending news variable (PDVMIL) and find that it is Granger caused by Factor 3 at
the 5 percent significance level. This result suggests that the approach adopted in
Ramey (2011a) most likely is not able to recover structural shocks.
6.4 Heterogeneity of Government Spending Components
We study the dynamic responses of our macroeconomic variables of interest to a one
percent shock in the related government spending variable. Since we are applying
logarithms to the variables, the IRFs can be interpreted as elasticities. The multipli-
ers can be recovered by taking the product of these elasticities and the ratio of the
average dollar level of the interest variable to the average dollar level of the shock
variable (government spending or the relevant component).
First, we study the dynamic responses to aggregate government spending shocks.
The IRFs are presented in Figure 3 for the MEDIUM and LARGE VARs and all
the related multipliers are reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Although, the
responses for GDP, durables consumption and real rates are similar for the two spec-
ifications, the MEDIUM VAR generally delivers a biased estimation of the impulse
response functions and hence, the multipliers. The GDP multiplier for aggregate gov-
ernment spending from the LARGE VAR is 0.79 upon impact and remains positive
and statistically significant for up to 4 quarters. The impact multipliers for durables
consumption and services consumption are not significantly different from zero, while
the impact multiplier for nondurables consumption is positive (0.11) and statistically
significant. Wages and private domestic investment do not respond significantly to
shocks in aggregate government spending, while rates decline upon impact before
recovering over the subsequent 4 and 8 quarters.
Next, we study the potentially different responses of output, consumption and
investment to the heterogeneous components of government spending. The IRFs
for shocks to consumption expenditures components of federal defence, federal non-
defence (civil) and state and local spending are presented in Figure 4. As in the
aggregate spending IRFs, the MEDIUM VAR delivers biased results. Focusing on
the LARGE VAR IRFs, the response of GDP to a shock in defence and state and
local consumption is positive and significant, whereas the response to a shock in
nondefence consumption is negative but statistically insignificant. The GDP im-
pact multiplier for state and local consumption is strongly above one at 1.61. The
responses of all personal consumption components to shocks are generally small in
magnitude and not significantly different from zero, except for shocks to state and
local consumption that elicit a positive and significant response from all three per-
sonal consumption components. The related impact multipliers are 0.50, 1.73 and
0.71 for durables, nondurables and services consumption, respectively. The response
of private domestic investment to shocks in consumption components of government
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Table 3: Multipliers for GDP and Consumption – MEDIUM VAR. Standard errors are
italicised. D, ND, and S are durables, nondurables and services consumption, respectively.
GDP D ND S
O
n
Im
p
a
c
t
Government Spend 0.71 (0.19) 0.02 (0.06) 0.09 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05)
Defence Spend 1.07 (0.34) 0.06 (0.10) 0.17 (0.09) -0.03 (0.08)
Defence Investment 1.23 (0.65) 0.20 (0.20) 0.28 (0.15) 0.12 (0.12)
Nondefence Spend -0.34 (0.53) -0.10 (0.17) 0.01 (0.14) 0.17 (0.13)
Nondefence Inv 6.37 (2.46) 0.04 (0.78) 1.01 (0.64) 0.85 (0.54)
S&L Spend 2.28 (0.89) 0.96 (0.31) 1.64 (0.22) 0.64 (0.22)
S&L Investment 2.27 (0.61) 0.55 (0.22) 0.15 (0.16) 0.24 (0.14)
A
ft
e
r
4
Q
u
a
rt
e
rs Government Spend 0.64 (0.45) 0.04 (0.11) 0.01 (0.09) 0.12 (0.11)
Defence Spend 1.15 (0.78) 0.13 (0.19) 0.16 (0.17) 0.24 (0.19)
Defence Investment -1.46 (1.32) -0.63 (0.34) -0.08 (0.28) -0.33 (0.32)
Nondefence Spend 2.56 (1.21) 0.47 (0.29) 0.11 (0.24) 0.42 (0.31)
Nondefence Inv 6.68 (6.40) -1.05 (1.46) 2.03 (1.17) 0.79 (1.59)
S&L Spend 0.02 (2.10) 0.46 (0.44) 0.13 (0.41) 0.77 (0.50)
S&L Investment 0.15 (1.16) -0.22 (0.31) 0.08 (0.29) -0.27 (0.29)
A
ft
e
r
8
Q
u
a
rt
e
rs Government Spend 0.15 (0.61) 0.01 (0.15) -0.08 (0.09) 0.16 (0.17)
Defence Spend 0.88 (0.92) 0.03 (0.25) 0.07 (0.14) 0.35 (0.28)
Defence Investment -2.96 (1.54) -0.81 (0.38) -0.22 (0.24) -0.51 (0.48)
Nondefence Spend 4.09 (1.46) 0.79 (0.36) 0.46 (0.24) 0.70 (0.39)
Nondefence Inv 8.39 (8.72) -1.17 (2.10) 1.19 (1.51) 0.35 (2.51)
S&L Spend 2.96 (2.37) 1.43 (0.47) 0.02 (0.46) 1.18 (0.61)
S&L Investment -0.49 (1.37) -0.03 (0.36) -0.02 (0.23) -0.35 (0.40)
Table 4: Multipliers for GDP and Consumption – LARGE VAR. Standard errors are itali-
cised. D, ND, and S are durables, nondurables and services consumption, respectively.
GDP D ND S
O
n
Im
p
a
c
t
Government Spend 0.79 (0.20) 0.02 (0.07) 0.11 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05)
Defence Spend 0.94 (0.37) 0.00 (0.13) 0.14 (0.10) -0.13 (0.09)
Defence Investment 0.66 (0.57) -0.06 (0.19) 0.17 (0.15) -0.11 (0.13)
Nondefence Spend -0.29 (0.46) -0.14 (0.16) 0.12 (0.12) 0.04 (0.11)
Nondefence Inv 4.99 (2.52) -0.66 (0.86) -0.13 (0.61) 0.79 (0.57)
S&L Spend 1.61 (0.98) 0.50 (0.32) 1.73 (0.24) 0.71 (0.22)
S&L Investment 2.89 (0.58) 0.73 (0.21) 0.23 (0.16) 0.22 (0.15)
A
ft
e
r
4
Q
u
a
rt
e
rs Government Spend 0.38 (0.38) -0.07 (0.10) 0.07 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09)
Defence Spend 0.39 (0.72) -0.16 (0.20) 0.07 (0.17) -0.19 (0.18)
Defence Investment -2.93 (1.10) -0.88 (0.29) -0.20 (0.28) -0.66 (0.27)
Nondefence Spend -0.03 (0.95) -0.09 (0.26) 0.16 (0.23) 0.11 (0.22)
Nondefence Inv 6.53 (4.61) 0.68 (1.28) 0.98 (1.13) 1.61 (1.13)
S&L Spend -0.62 (1.71) -0.33 (0.47) 0.71 (0.43) 0.47 (0.44)
S&L Investment 1.76 (1.13) 0.23 (0.31) 0.36 (0.29) -0.13 (0.28)
A
ft
e
r
8
Q
u
a
rt
e
rs Government Spend 0.05 (0.51) -0.10 (0.12) 0.00 (0.10) -0.12 (0.14)
Defence Spend -0.66 (0.99) -0.28 (0.25) -0.13 (0.20) -0.28 (0.28)
Defence Investment -3.30 (1.63) -0.73 (0.42) -0.39 (0.35) -0.72 (0.45)
Nondefence Spend 0.27 (1.39) -0.03 (0.35) 0.15 (0.29) 0.00 (0.39)
Nondefence Inv 15.57 (6.35) 2.11 (1.67) 2.76 (1.40) 2.52 (1.82)
S&L Spend -0.65 (2.55) -0.14 (0.63) 0.19 (0.52) 0.00 (0.69)
S&L Investment 0.86 (1.62) 0.11 (0.40) 0.22 (0.35) -0.21 (0.45)
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spending indicates that investment is crowded out by public spending. The response
of real rates is negative upon impact and then generally recovers in 4 to 8 quarters.
Similarly, the IRFs for shocks to investment components of federal defence, fed-
eral nondefence (civil) and state and local spending are presented in Figure 5. The
LARGE VAR IRFs for GDP are positive and significant upon impact across the
three investment components of government spending. While the GDP response to
shocks in federal nondefence and state and local investment components is persistent,
the response to federal defence investment turns negative immediately after impact.
The GDP multipliers reflect this result. While the GDP multipliers for both fed-
eral nondefence and state and local investment are significantly above one for several
quarters, the multiplier for defence investment is mildly positive upon impact and
becomes significantly negative soon after impact. The consumption responses and
multipliers are generally close to zero and insignificant upon impact, except state and
local investment. While the defence investment component of government spending
elicits a negative and significant response from the three personal consumption com-
ponents in the medium run, nondefence investment and state and local investment
stimulate a positive and persistent response. The same holds true for private domes-
tic investment. The consumption multipliers for nondefence investment and state
and local investment are quite high.
The above results show that the different components of government spending
elicit remarkably heterogeneous responses from the various output, consumption and
investment variables that we study. Generally, the nondefence and state and local
components produce positive responses while the same does not hold true for defence
components. This heterogeneity of the responses may partially explain the subsample
instability due to the changing composition of government spending over time.
6.5 Expectation Augmented Large VAR
To further analyse the results uncovered by our Granger causality tests, we expand the
MEDIUM and LARGE VAR specifications to incorporate “Ramey” forecasts errors
and expectation revisions as defined by Perotti (2011) using quarterly forecasts of real
federal spending and real state and local spending from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF). Unfortunately, it is not possible to include these forecasts in levels
in the VAR, as would be natural to do, since the base year changes several times in
the sample. To overcome this issue, the surprises in government spending are defined
in Perotti (2011) as
∆gf.err.t = ∆gt −∆get|t−1 = (gt − gt−1)− (get|t−1 − get−1|t−1) (17)
where ∆gf.err.t is the forecast error in the growth rate of government spending and
∆gt−∆get|t−1 are the realised growth rate and the forecasted growth rate one quarter
before, respectively. This definition assumes that the SPF forecasts are good proxies
for the representative agent’s expectations. Moreover, it is also assumed that the
agent knows the value of government spending in the current quarter. In reality,
professional forecasters in SPF do not know the value of gt. For this reason Perotti
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Figure 3: Large and Medium VAR (1959Q1:2010Q4). This figure presents the impulse response
functions to a shock in Government Consumption and Investment. Each chart shows the LARGE
VAR response for the period 1959Q1 to 2010Q4 as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals
at the 0.68. The dashed line in each chart is the response for the MEDIUM VAR for the same period.
(2011) proposes to decompose these forecast errors as
∆gf.err.t = ∆gt −∆get|t−1 = (∆gt −∆get|t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
time t’s surprise in ∆gt
+ (∆get|t −∆get|t−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
revision of expectation of ∆gt
(18)
where the first term captures the realisation of government spending growth over its
expectations in t and the second term captures the revision of the agent’s expectations
about ∆gt. While the first term is not in the information set of the agent at time t,
the second term is the actual shock to expectations and could proxy for the news in
the information flow of the agent, as proposed in neoclassical models.
In our VAR specification, we use both of these definitions to encapsulate forward-
looking expectations of the agent. The results for federal spending are shown in
Figure 6, while the state and local spending results are shown in Figure 7.23
23In the VAR specifications where the forecast errors and expectation revisions are used, they
are ordered first. For the federal spending VAR, the various components of federal spending (con-
sumption and investment components of federal defence and nondefence) are aggregated as the SPF
forecasts are at an aggregate level. A similar approach is adopted for state and local spending.
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Following Perotti (2011), the IRFs show the dynamic response of macroeconomic
variables of interest to a shock in the relevant expectations variable normalised such
that the respective government spend (federal or state and local) peaks at one over
the horizon. Using this methodology allows a direct comparison of these IRFs with
the IRFs from the SVARs. Using the “Ramey” forecast errors, the MEDIUM SVAR
and EVAR deliver broadly similar results, while the LARGE SVAR and EVAR de-
liver a strikingly similar result. This confirms the Granger causality results that the
“Ramey” forecast errors are not fundamental. The intuition for these results, as
observed in Perotti (2011) is that the strong predictive power of “Ramey” forecast
error for government spending reported in Ramey (2011a) is due to the extremely
low predictive power of expected government spending growth. The forecast error is
almost equivalent to actual spending growth less some noise. This can explain the
almost identical impulse responses of SVARs and EVARs when applied to the same
dataset.
6.6 Robustness of Results
The results reported in this paper are robust to using flat hyperpriors as well as an
in-sample methodology to fixing λ as discussed in Banbura et al. (2010) . Moreover
the results are similar over a wide range of values for τ and λ.
The results for the subsample 1981Q1-2010Q4 are robust to the inclusion of ad-
ditional potentially forward-looking variables, including Conference Board CEO con-
fidence index, Conference Board consumer confidence index U.S. housing price index
and NASDAQ. These variables are not available for the full sample. We also con-
sidered additional variables such as new job advertisements, sovereign CDS spreads,
employment and real estate related Web searches; unfortunately these variables are
not available even for the shorter subsample.
We also included in our dataset a stock and a flow measure of the public debt
level. Our results are robust to the exclusion of these two variables. Finally, the
results are robust to the exclusion of the recent financial and economic crisis.
7 Conclusions
Using a Large Bayesian VAR approach it is possible to significantly expand the
information set used to analyse shocks to government spending. Large information
datasets are generally considered good approximations of the whole economy. For
this reason, we believe that Large Bayesian VAR techniques allow for a more careful
study of fiscal shocks while controlling for issues of non-fundamentalness and more
generally for omitted variable problems.
The key results of our paper can be distilled as follows. First, the subsample
instability previously reported appears to be significantly mitigated using a large
information approach and is reduced to a statistically insignificant level, given the
confidence level delivered by our econometric tools. After controlling for changes in
monetary policy, fiscal policy, budget structure, credit access, financial markets and
openness of the economy, the dynamic responses of macroeconomics variables appear
to be essentially the same across subsamples. This could be an indication that deep
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habits of economic agents – that are embedded in structural parameters – might
be more stable and persistent across time than previously reported. To verify this
conjecture it would be interesting for future research to apply the same methodology
to different settings. The results on structural breaks in the U.S. economy reported in
many recent papers contrast with our findings. If validated, a possible interpretation
of our results is that studies conducted using limited information capture policy and
market structure changes rather than changes in deep structural parameters of the
economy. However, we recognise this difference can be quite nuanced and depends
on the model adopted.
Second, the traditional SVAR approach shows signs of non-fundamentalness for
small VARs (similar findings have been reported in Forni and Gambetti (2010)).
While the issue of non-fundamentalness appears to be mitigated using a moderate
number of variables (for example, our nine-variable MEDIUM VAR), the more general
problem of omitted variables remains, resulting in biased IRFs to fiscal shocks.
Third, the EVAR approach proposed in Ramey (2011a) to overcome non-funda-
mentalness in small VARs seems to suffer from the same issue. Moreover, using a
large information set the dynamic responses to shocks in expectations, as defined in
Ramey (2011a), appear to be identical to the IRFs produced using the SVAR ap-
proach. This result was conjectured in Perotti (2011) and holds partially true using
smaller VARs as well (for example, our MEDIUM VAR).
Fourth, our LARGE VAR seems to overcome the non-fundamentalness issues
present in all of the other specifications. Using this LARGE VAR the macroeco-
nomic variables related to output, consumption and investment show a remarkably
heterogeneous dynamic response to shocks in different components of government
consumption and investment. In particular, defence spending appears to elicit dy-
namic responses qualitatively different compared with nondefence spending. This
result, partially reported in previous studies, raises issues of validity when using de-
fence shocks to identify the dynamic effects of public spending. In general terms, this
may be related to the issue of aggregation of macroeconomic variables.
Our results are broadly consistent with previous findings from SVARs, as stated
in Hall (2009): “the output multiplier is in the range from 0.5 to 1.0 and [...] the
consumption multiplier is somewhat positive”. Generally, consumption components
and private investment appear to be rather unresponsive to shocks in government
spending, at odds with neoclassical theory. Conversely, investment components that
are thought to be directly productive generally elicit large positive responses in GDP,
consumption and investment. The same holds true for the state and local consump-
tion components where social spending is likely to be more localised. In this respect,
state and local public spending generates services, such as health and education,
which enter either in the production function or in the consumers’ utility function, or
both. These findings can therefore be explained in a neoclassical framework as well.
This study suffers from two main limitations, largely common to the SVAR and
EVAR literature, and leaves many questions open. The results on multipliers and
IRFs presented in this paper need to be read in light of these limitations.
First, government spending shocks have been identified via a generalised recursive
identification with the shocks always ordered first. We believe this identification
is largely sensible and is chosen with the aim of assessing previous findings with
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the SVAR and EVAR approaches that apply this methodology in different settings.
However, this assumption of the exogeneity of government spending with respect to
contemporaneous shocks to other macroeconomic variables could be incorrect. In this
respect, it is reassuring that results in Forni and Gambetti (2010) obtained using a
different approach and a sign restriction identification are broadly consistent with
our findings.
Second, the government spending multipliers cannot be thought of as deep struc-
tural parameters of the economy. There is no single government spending multiplier
and its value is likely to depend on the country, the economic phase, the interaction
between monetary and fiscal policy regimes in place, and the degree of openness of
the economy (e.g. Woodford (2011); Ilzetzki et al. (2010); Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012); Hall (2009)). Applying a static linear VAR approach, we estimate
time-invariant and linear (marginally constant and symmetric with respect to the
sign of the shock) government multipliers. Therefore, we implicitly assumed through
our choice of the econometric model that the government spending multipliers are
independent of the state of the economy, do not change with the magnitude of the
shock, and that positive and negative shocks impinge on the economy in a symmetric
way (a thoughtful discussion on this point can be found in Parker (2011)). All these
previous assumptions are likely to be false. Hence, the only correct way to inter-
pret our IRFs and multipliers is as statistical averages over largely different economic
conditions and policies.
The results presented by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) obtained using a
small nonlinear VAR to analyse fiscal shocks in expansions and recessions could be
seen as providing complementary evidence to ours. While their nonlinear VAR is
able to address issues related to the variation of multipliers across business cycles,
they use a very small information set, potentially prone to omitted variables. Finally,
results from natural experiments that aim to bridge the gap between microeconomic
and macroeconomic levels are complementary evidence necessary to put our results
in the correct perspective (e.g., in Acconcia et al. (2011); Nakamura and Steinsson
(2011); Wilson (2010)).
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Figure 4: Large and Medium VAR – Government Consumption Components
(1959Q1:2010Q4). This figure presents the impulse response functions to a shock in a speci-
fied component of Government Consumption and Expenditures. The left, middle and right columns
of plots depict the responses to a shock in federal defence consumption, federal nondefence (civil)
consumption, and state and local consumption, respectively. Each chart shows the LARGE VAR
response for the period 1959Q1 to 2010Q4 as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals
at the 0.68 level. The dashed line in each chart is the response for the MEDIUM VAR for the same
period.
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Figure 5: Large and Medium VAR – Government Investment Components
(1959Q1:2010Q4). This figure presents the impulse response functions to a shock in a speci-
fied component of Government Investment. The left, middle and right columns of plots depict the
responses to a shock in federal defence investment, federal nondefence (civil) investment, and state
and local investment, respectively. Each chart shows the LARGE VAR response for the period
1959Q1 to 2010Q4 as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals at the 0.68 level. The
dashed line in each chart is the response for the MEDIUM VAR for the same period.
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Figure 6: Large and Medium VAR SPF – Federal Spending (1982Q1:2010Q4). This figure
presents the impulse response functions to a shock in federal spending and federal spending forecasts.
The left, middle and right columns of plots depict the responses to a shock in federal spending, federal
spending forecast error, and federal spending expectation revision, respectively. Each chart shows
the LARGE VAR response for the period 1982Q1 to 2010Q4 as a solid line with shaded posterior
coverage intervals at the 0.68 and 0.9 level. The dashed line in each chart is the response for the
MEDIUM VAR for the same period.
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Figure 7: Large and Medium VAR SPF – State and Local Spending (1982Q1:2010Q4).
This figure presents the impulse response functions to a shock in state and local spending and state
and local spending forecasts. The left, middle and right columns of plots depict the responses to
a shock in state and local spending, state and local spending forecast error, and state and local
spending expectation revision, respectively. Each chart shows the LARGE VAR response for the
period 1982Q1 to 2010Q4 as a solid line with shaded posterior coverage intervals at the 0.68 and 0.9
level. The dashed line in each chart is the response for the MEDIUM VAR for the same period.
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A A Simple Model
In order to illustrate the large information approach to address the issue of funda-
mentalness, let us consider the simple model proposed in Perotti (2011) and derived
from Leeper et al. (2008)24
MaxEt
∞∑
i=0
βi logCt+i (19)
s.t. Ct +Kt +Gt = ZtK
α
t−1 (20)
where Ct, Kt and Gt are consumption, capital and government expenditure, respec-
tively. The productivity factor Zt follows a lognormal process with mean zero and
variance σ2z . The agent’s Euler equation is
Et
[
β(1 +Rt+1)
Ct
Ct+1
]
= 1 (21)
and at the non-stochastic steady state 1 + Rss = 1/β and Kss = (αβ)
1
1−α . Log-
linearising around the steady state we get
ct − Et[ct+1] + Et[zt+1] + (α− 1)kt = 0 (22)
where the lower case letters denote log deviations from the steady state. Linearising
the budget constraint and substituting it into the Euler equation, we find the equi-
librium equation for kt. For sufficiently small government consumption at the steady
state, G, the equation admits a stable solution
kt − λ1kt−1 = − 1
λ2αβ
∞∑
i=0
1
λi2
Et [((G+ αβ)zt+i+1 − zt+i) +G(gt+1+i − gt+1)] (23)
where λ1 < 1 and λ2 > 1 are the roots of the characteristic equation.
We assume that log deviations for government consumption expenditure follow
an exogenous process specified by
gt = γt|t−1 (24)
where γt|t−1 is a white noise shock that is known at time t− 1. We assume that due
to an implementation lag the innovation is known to the agent one lag before being
realised.
The equilibrium solution for kt is
kt − λ1kt−1 = 1
λ2αβ
zt − G
λ2αβ
γt|t−1 −
G
λ2αβ
(
1− 1
λ2
)
γt+1|t . (25)
We can rewrite the equation in more compact form as
kt − λ1kt−1 = δzt + pi0γt|t−1 + pi1γt+1|t (26)
24A similar argument has been proposed in Forni and Gambetti (2010) for factor models.
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where the coefficients are defined as in the prior equation.
The VARMA representation is 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1− λ1L
 gtzt
kt
 =
 L 00 1
pi1 + pi0L δ
( γt+1|t
zt
)
(27)
Given the invertibility of the AR component, we can reformulate the system in
the MA representation gtzt
kt
 =
 L 00 1
pi1+pi0L
1−λ1L
δ
1−λ1L
( γt+1|t
zt
)
(28)
The MA component for the square subsystem given by capital and government con-
sumption expenditure is non-fundamental.(
gt
kt
)
=
(
L 0
pi1+pi0L
1−λ1L
δ
1−λ1L
)(
γt+1|t
zt
)
(29)
To verify that the structural shocks are non fundamental, it is sufficient to observe
that the determinant of the relative squared MA component is equal to δz1−λz and
has root equal to zero and is inside the unit circle. This is also true for the other
two-by-two subsystems (
gt
zt
)
=
(
L 0
0 1
)(
γt+1|t
zt
)
(30)
(
zt
kt
)
=
(
0 1
pi1+pi0L
1−λ1L
δ
1−λ1L
)(
γt+1|t
zt
)
(31)
for which the determinants of the MA matrix are z and pi1+pi0z1−λz , respectively and have
roots 0 and −pi1/pi0, both less than one.
To recover fundamental representations of the two-by-two system for zt and gt we
could apply the following Blaschke matrix 1 0
0
z+
pi1
pi0
1+
pi1
pi0
z
 . (32)
Note that a priori it is difficult to guess the exact form of the transformation needed.
Instead, including the larger set of variables, we get a finite order VAR(2) (of
reduced rank) for the VARMA representation for which the structural shocks are
fundamental: 1 + pi0pi1L δpi1L − 1pi1L+ λ1pi1L20 1 0
−pi0pi1 − δpi1 1pi1 − λ1pi1L
 gtzt
kt
 =
 0 00 1
1 0
( γt+1|t
zt
)
. (33)
39
Adding an unanticipated shock (the structural shock of interest) to government
spending
gt = γt|t−1 + εt , (34)
we get the equilibrium solution for kt
kt − λ1kt−1 = δzt + pi0γt|t−1 + pi1γt+1|t + pi0εt . (35)
The VAR(2) representation is now: 1 + pi0pi1L δpi1L − 1pi1L+ λ1pi1L20 1 0
−pi0pi1 − δpi1 1pi1 − λ1pi1L
 gtzt
kt
 =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 εtzt
γt+1|t
 . (36)
We can observe that the unanticipated fiscal shocks can be recovered with a
recursive identification since the matrix of contemporaneous correlations is:
A0 =
 1 0 00 1 0
−pi0pi1 − δpi1 1pi1
 C =
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 . (37)
40
B Data and Description of Variables
We identify the relevant components of U.S. national income for our study using
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) which are made available by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce on their website.25
All data for the macroeconomic variables used in our model specifications are
from publicly available sources. The primary source for the macroeconomic series is
FRED Economic Data available from the website of the Federal Reserve Board of St.
Louis.26 Where available we use the real economic series from FRED, all of which
are chained to 2005 dollars. Where the length of the real series is shorter than our
sample period, we collect the nominal series and deflate it using the GDP deflator
(GDPDEF) which is indexed at 100 in 2005.
The total public debt series (PUBDEBT) is collected from the website of the U.S.
Department of Treasury.27
We use the consumer sentiment index developed by the University of Michigan
available on their website.28 The survey data is also available as part of the FRED
Economic Data.
We collect federal government and state and local government spending forecasts
published in the Survey of Professional Forecasters available on the website of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.29
25www.bea.gov/national/index.htm. A guide to the description and calculation methodology of
the main economic accounts is available at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/national/nipa/methpap/
mpi1_0907.pdf
26research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
27http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/Pages/index.aspx
28http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/
29http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/
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